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The Tobacco Industry:

A Hindrance to the Elimination of Child Labor

“Our voices are being drowned out by false promises of economic prosperity from cigarette makers and leaf buying companies.”

–Tobacco and Allied Workers Union of Malawi (TOAWUM), 2014

A. Fast Facts

Child labor in tobacco falls under “worst forms of child labor.”¹

The hazards of tobacco handling² and toxic exposure to pesticides used in tobacco farming are undisputed. Child labor in tobacco rightfully falls under the category “worst forms of child labor” due to the hazardous nature of work in the tobacco sector. According to International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions, child labor in such sectors should be prohibited along with forced labor and commercial exploitation of children (prostitution and pornography). Countries like India, Brazil, Malawi,³ South Africa, Uganda and Ghana⁴ prohibit or penalize those that allow children to work in tobacco fields.⁵

CHILD LABOR: Work below the minimum age for work, as established in national legislation that conforms to international standards, includes the worst forms of child labor.⁶

WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR refer to activities such as forced labor, slavery, prostitution and hazardous work, in accordance with the ILO Convention.⁷

HAZARDOUS WORK: Work which, by its nature or the circumstances under which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of the child.⁸ ILO directs countries to consult with employers and workers to identify the types of hazardous work that should be prohibited by law or regulation.⁹ Hazardous work lists may describe specific activities, occupations, industries or conditions.

B. Quick Stats

Estimated child labor globally: 160 million children (1 in every 10 children worldwide)¹⁰

Estimated child labor in hazardous workplaces: 79 million children¹¹

Estimated child labor in agriculture: 112 million children¹²

Estimated tobacco child labor: 1.3 million children¹³

Benefit of eliminating child labor: US \$2-5 trillion vs US \$760 billion in cost¹⁴

Causes of child labor: Poverty and demand for cheap labor,¹⁵ lack of well enforced laws¹⁶

i Please note: There are no accurate global estimates of CHILD LABOUR in TOBACCO, but it continues to be rampant world-wide and has been on the increase in the last two decades, especially in low- and middle-income countries. For example, a study on the tobacco sector in Malawi revealed that 78 percent of children between the ages of 10 and 14 worked with their parents on tobacco estates on a full-time or part-time basis, and it also noted that children under the age of 10 were found working with their parents as full-time workers on the estates. See: W. C. D. Kamkondo and K. Wellard, Women and Children in the Smallholder and Estate Subsector in Malawi, supplementary report to Estate Extension Service Trust (Lilongwe: Rural Development Department, Bunda College of Agriculture, 1994), as cited in Child Labour in the Tobacco-Growing Sector in Africa at 40; Cited in: United States Department of Labor, 2001 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Malawi, 7 June 2002, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/48c8c9dbc.html> [accessed 4 June 2021]

C. Impact on the Child

- **Nicotine poisoning** with symptoms such as insomnia, dizziness, headaches, dehydration, fatigue, nausea and vomiting caused by absorption of nicotine via the skin during the handling of tobacco (green tobacco sickness).¹⁷
- **Impeded economic and social advancement** of the child due to loss of education.¹⁸
- **High risk of cancer, tuberculosis, infertility, psychological imbalance, immune system dysfunction and neurological damage** due to long durations of hazardous exposure to chemicals such as pesticides, herbicides, fumigants and growth inhibitors, causing serious health harms.¹⁹
- **Long-term malnutrition and infectious diseases** due to poor nutrition and hygiene during developmental stage owing to lack of adequate food, clean water and sanitation facilities.²⁰
- **Long-term musculoskeletal damage** due to repetitive strain injuries resulting in chronic pain, arthritis, muscle twitching and bending of bones; caused by constant heavy lifting and strenuous manual labor.²¹

Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Child Labor: An Inherent Contradiction²²

Tobacco is uniquely harmful and kills half of its users. The tobacco industry's commercial interest is in conflict with basic human rights. CSR regulation and self-reporting is counterproductive in the tobacco industry.²³ Furthermore, the tobacco control treaty requires policies on tobacco production to be protected from tobacco industry interference.²⁴

To give an impression of fighting child labor, transnational tobacco companies flaunt their self-reporting system on agricultural practices and supply chain audit (due diligence) regimes²⁵ as well as their anti-child labor initiatives,²⁶ which is largely based on the work of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing (ECLT) Foundation.²⁷ In undertaking such so-called CSR activities to eliminate child labor, the transnational tobacco companies give a false notion that they are comparable with the rest of the business community,²⁸ thereby diverting attention from the fact that tobacco production is not like any other business: Tobacco products are unique in that they provide no social benefit, kill 8 million people annually²⁹ and cost the global economy US \$1.4 trillion every year.³⁰

Publicity of this so-called CSR, in addition to being a violation of many tobacco sponsorship bans around the world, gives a false impression that the tobacco industry can be relied on to undertake voluntary due diligence practices on its supply chain;³¹ even when the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) provides that the tobacco industry must be strictly regulated by governments and cannot be trusted to provide any form of self-regulation.

The tobacco industry employs a public relations strategy that diverts attention from the true impact of child labor in tobacco production, obscures genuine solutions, undermines diversification strategies, drowns the voices of stakeholders and escapes culpability. Consistent with expert recommendations and good practices, WHO FCTC guidance recommends strong government regulation³² and frameworks, independent research and diversification that are sustainably financed and protected from tobacco industry interference.³³

Because of the need to protect against tobacco industry interference, non-government organizations (NGOs) and government officials refuse partnerships with the tobacco industry.³⁴ Only civil society not affiliated with the tobacco industry are allowed to engage with governments, and private sector partnerships of the tobacco industry with the governments are not acceptable.³⁵

Unfair Practices of Tobacco Companies That Aggravate Child Labor:

Tobacco workers and stakeholders assert that tobacco companies are “perpetuating extreme forms of child labour” and provide these practices as basis. Tobacco companies:

- A. Keep wages low.** Tobacco companies determine the level of wages and have control over the salaries that suppliers or contractors pay.³⁶
- B. Keep tobacco prices low** and loan interest rates high for agricultural inputs. Tobacco companies “determine the price of agricultural inputs, seeds, pesticides, and other supplies,³⁷as well as the price and classification of the tobacco leaf once it’s harvested... small farmers have little control or room to negotiate.”³⁸
- C. Provide incentives such as loans** that keep farmers dependent, although real prices or financial benefits remain low.³⁹ The solution to eliminating child labor in the tobacco sector lies in shifting farmers to alternative livelihoods.
- D. Deny rights to organize⁴⁰ and refuse to accept unions as part of negotiations,⁴¹** leading to a lack of collective bargaining agreements and freedom of association.⁴²

E. Drown out voices of genuine stakeholders. The involvement of tobacco executives and tobacco-funded groups in so-called CSR activities further obscures the voices of the real stakeholders.⁴³ Tobacco companies use agricultural front groups, partner with renowned organizations and work with businesspeople and politicians to lobby against tobacco control measures, effectively suppressing progress towards diversification strategies.⁴⁴

F. Allow living and working conditions to remain poor. This includes poor housing, poor drinking water, polluted soils and reduced protections for occupational health and safety. Notably, tobacco companies encourage “excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals.”⁴⁵

G. Avoid having direct responsibility over the welfare of farmers. To avoid culpability for the above practices, tobacco companies hide behind layers of contracts and protocols.⁴⁶ Tobacco companies have not shown that their contracts fully protect the sector against child labor (e.g., that wages and prices are sufficiently high, or takes responsibility for child labor and covers for damages arising from the same).

How the Tobacco Industry Undermines Efforts to Eliminate Child Labor

A. The tobacco industry’s public relations (PR) and lobbying strategies to eliminate child labor are diametrically opposed to internationally agreed solutions to end child labor.

Aside from the ILO’s strategies to address decent work deficits in the tobacco sector,⁴⁷ the WHO FCTC’s Policy Options and Recommendations on Economically Viable Alternatives to Tobacco Growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC)⁴⁸ laid out strategies to address problems in tobacco production including child labor. This primarily calls for **farmer and worker-driven policies and programs towards diversification⁴⁹ that are sustainably financed and protected from tobacco industry interference.**⁵⁰ However, tobacco companies lobby and influence policy-making (even using undue influence and bribery) to delay or resist tobacco control,⁵¹ to exaggerate its contribution to the economy,⁵² dilute political will due to symbiotic relationships with the tobacco industry and politicians,⁵³ and use front groups that promote tobacco company interests,⁵⁴ effectively drowning out genuine stakeholder interests.

- Agreed solutions also include recommendations for tobacco-growing countries to “consider reallocating public funds/subsidies used for tobacco production to alternative livelihoods/activities.”⁵⁵ In contrast, the tobacco industry is leveraging on incentives that ensure dependency on the crop,⁵⁶ despite tobacco prices remaining low.⁵⁷
- The tobacco industry falsely uses economic downfall and worker’s plight in tobacco agriculture to counter tobacco tax increases,⁵⁸ when in reality, the rate of change in consumption allows sufficient time for adjustments towards diversification.⁵⁹
- Sustainable financing of diversification programs is crucial in eliminating child labor in tobacco, and yet, tobacco companies vehemently oppose all forms of tobacco tax increases, including those that have a potential to finance diversification programs.⁶⁰

B. The tobacco industry’s practice of incentivizing tobacco production and undermining diversification strategies keeps farmers addicted to tobacco farming, and children tied to laboring on tobacco farms.

As part of its core business and supply chain, the tobacco industry provides a false impression that it is supportive of tobacco farming and its related

communities, hence providing so-called CSR initiatives for technical and financial support for farming.⁶¹ However, incentivizing tobacco farming goes against diversification, which is a key solution to addressing the health and environmental harms of tobacco.⁶² Governments should instead incentivize alternative livelihood,⁶³ and should not be made to compete with tobacco industry incentives for tobacco production.

Financial arrangements contrived by the tobacco industry are purposed to keep farmers addicted to tobacco farming.⁶⁴ Some of the incentives provided by tobacco companies, such as loans, are meant to continually lure tobacco farmers and workers into tobacco production and keep them dependent on it,⁶⁵ and ultimately, constantly indebted and impoverished.⁶⁶ This perpetuates the use of child labor.

C. Tobacco companies’ so-called CSR initiatives divert attention from tobacco’s impact on child labor.

CSR activities on labor rights involve approaches that scholars have criticized as “ineffective in improving labour standards” (e.g., private voluntary initiatives like social auditing, ethical certification and supplier codes of conduct);⁶⁷ due to the “serious gaps between CSR promises and actual outcomes.” Tobacco companies’ CSR, such as education programs, supplier due diligence or good environmental/

agricultural practices,⁶⁸ are worse in that they divert attention from tobacco company practices that perpetuate child labor and worsen its impact.⁶⁹ The tobacco industry is primarily responsible for child labor in its supply chain because it keeps tobacco prices and wages low, then provide “incentives” that keep farmers in debt, deny bargaining powers to workers, allow working conditions to remain poor, drown out the voices of stakeholders and avoid direct responsibility for them.

Voluntary due diligence is generally insufficient, especially for the tobacco industry.

Experts have warned against voluntary due diligence or audit regimes or otherwise relying on the private sector to address human rights and environment issues.^{70,71} A study in the retail industry shows that such initiatives are illusory, effectively “perpetuating the cycle of inequality, corporate power, environmental harms and more,” and preserve models that focus on “cheap labour, cheap goods, low prices and short-term purchase contracts.”

Tobacco CSR builds tobacco companies’ brands and corporate image,⁷² but obscures the extent of harm caused by

tobacco production.⁷³ A study that calls for stronger tobacco sponsorship bans⁷⁴ shows that the tobacco transnationals use Twitter to project that they are leading in the elimination of child labor but fail to show how they caused the problem.^{75,76} In many countries, publicizing these activities are deemed a violation of sponsorship bans required by the WHO FCTC which is embodied in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).⁷⁷

D. Tobacco companies’ front groups hinder true stakeholder participation and drown out the voices of farmers and workers.⁷⁸

Global consensus and treaty policy dictate that tobacco companies have no place in policy-making related to agricultural diversification, and that such efforts must be driven by workers/farmers.⁷⁹ Specifically, governments are urged to promote “alternatives to tobacco growing and avoid tobacco industry obstruction in programs meant for the welfare and diversification of tobacco growers and workers and the protection of the environment...”⁸⁰

However, tobacco farmers and workers directly affected in tobacco production and involved in environmental harms, are poorly represented. This is exacerbated by the fact that transnational tobacco companies have set up and funded front groups like the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA)⁸¹ to lobby on their behalf in order to falsely represent farmers’ socio-economic arguments⁸²

as basis to challenge tobacco control measures such as tax increases.⁸³ Tobacco workers have also accused the tobacco companies of drowning their voices with false promises during discussions around the value of the tobacco industry-funded Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing (ECLT) Foundation.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the tobacco industry took up stakeholder space in discussions on diversification through the Philip Morris-funded Foundation for Smoke-Free World's (FSFW) Agriculture Transformation Initiative (ATI),⁸⁵ despite the need to protect agricultural and environmental policies on tobacco from commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry, in line with Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.

Notably, the interests of tobacco companies and laborers are diametrically opposed: The tobacco industry's interest is to seek the lowest price/highest profit and to avoid culpability for health and occupational harms, while the laborers' interest is to increase prices and to be compensated for harms.

E. The tobacco industry avoids culpability and refuses to compensate children for damages.

Overall, the tobacco industry tries to distance itself from the reality of deaths and harms.⁸⁶ Ultimately, any "social good" the tobacco industry does is fake if it does not acknowledge responsibility for all the deaths and diseases caused by

its products⁸⁷ throughout the product life cycle.

Related to tobacco production, the tobacco industry has yet to be held accountable for failure to root out child labor in its supply chain. When held to account for children's plight, it firmly avoids culpability through legal defenses and attempts to play the victim. Through third-party contracts, tobacco companies try to distance themselves from being responsible for child labor. For instance:

- PMI claims to impose standards⁸⁸ on its supply chain but, in different countries, uses third parties instead of direct purchase to impose this standard,⁸⁹ thus removing itself from potential liability.
- In 2020, children of Malawi sued British American Tobacco (BAT) and Imperial Brands, both based in the U.K. for compensation to damages arising from child labor.⁹⁰ And although this resulted in the U.S. barring imports of Malawi tobacco,⁹¹ the tobacco companies have sought a dismissal of the case based on the grounds that "lawyers for the farming families cannot prove the tobacco they grew ended up in their cigarettes and other products."⁹²


- In 2007, Brazilian tobacco companies sought to escape employer duties by pointing to the service agreement contract (as opposed to an employment contract). This supports the observation that the tobacco companies' response to human rights involves shifting the ultimate culpability to leaf companies and dressing this up with public relations strategies.⁹³
- In a Brazilian Child Labor investigation in 1998, the producers (primarily BAT affiliates) were found to be "the victims, and not the responsible party, since they ended up being forced to rely on their children's work in order to meet the conditions stipulated in the clauses imposed by the companies."⁹⁴
- In 2021, a large Brazilian tobacco exporter, Continental Tobaccos Alliance, faced slavery charges for contractual employment of nine children, all underpaid, living in poor conditions and suffering from acute intoxication and nausea. The company said it was not responsible for the workers, despite having a contract with the farm owners.⁹⁵

Notably, governments are mandated to cooperate with one another in dealing with tobacco industry liability, including compensation.⁹⁶

The tobacco industry, which continues to forego responsibility for the illegal exploitation of children in the tobacco industry's production workforce, needs to be called to account.

"The tobacco industry falsely uses economic downfall and worker's plight in tobacco agriculture to counter tobacco tax increases, when in reality, the rate of change in consumption allows sufficient time for adjustments towards diversification."

Countries Reported to Have Child Labor in Tobacco:⁹⁷



About 125 countries produce tobacco,⁹⁸ with the majority of the world's tobacco grown in China and India.⁹⁹ However, reports on child labor are scarce.

1. Argentina
2. Bangladesh
3. Brazil
4. Cambodia
5. India
6. Indonesia
7. Kenya
8. Kyrgyz Republic
9. Lebanon
10. Malawi
11. Mexico
12. Mozambique
13. Nicaragua
14. Philippines
15. Tanzania
16. Uganda
17. Vietnam
18. Zambia
19. Zimbabwe

Source: US Department of Labor, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.

Parts of the Supply Chain Where Child Labor in Tobacco Occurs:

Child labor happens mainly in the production stage of the tobacco supply chain, up to delivery to leaf buyers and/or factories for manufacture. The tobacco industry has not looked through its whole supply chain to stamp out child labor.¹⁰⁰ Notably, most of its CSR focuses on farms.¹⁰¹

A. Growers/farmers

B. Leaf dryers/processors

C. Leaf storage facility

D. Local leaf buyers or consolidators/
cooperatives (market intermediaries/
government)


E. Cigarette/tobacco factory

F. Distributor/exporter

G. Importer/wholesaler

H. Retailer

I. Consumer



Source: Adopted from the US DOL's illustration of the supply chains for coffee and the cut flower and panela (unrefined whole cane sugar) sectors. In: US Department of Labor, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; "The Harvest is in My Blood" Hazardous Child Labor in Tobacco Farming in Indonesia. Human Rights Watch (2016). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/indonesia0516web_0.pdf [accessed 7 June 2021].

Types of Hazardous Work in the Tobacco Sector Undertaken by Children:

Agriculture, in general, is classified as one of the three most hazardous sectors of activity, along with construction and mining.¹⁰² As of 2020, 112 million children are employed in agriculture, which makes up 70% of all children in child labor, and mostly includes children aged 5 to 11 years.¹⁰³ Children employed in tobacco perform the following tasks, which have severe detrimental consequences on the health and safety of the child.¹⁰⁴

- Digging with hoes to prepare fields for planting
- Planting tobacco seedlings
- Watering fields
- Applying fertilizers
- Mixing and applying pesticides
- Removing flowers and competing leaves from plants
- Harvesting tobacco leaves by hand
- Carrying bundles of harvested leaves
- Wrapping or rolling of leaves to prepare them for curing
- Cutting tobacco leaves
- Spreading tobacco in the sun to dry
- Tying or piercing leaves to attach them to bamboo sticks for drying
- Lifting sticks of tobacco leaves and loading them into curing barns
- Climbing onto beams in curing barns to hang tobacco to dry
- Maintaining fires to heat curing barns
- Untying dried tobacco leaves from bamboo sticks
- Sorting and classifying dried tobacco
- Bundling dried tobacco into bales

Source: "The Harvest is in My Blood" Hazardous Child Labor in Tobacco Farming in Indonesia. Human Rights Watch (2016). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/indonesia0516web_0.pdf [accessed 7 June 2021].

Acknowledgements and Authorship

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Endnotes

- 1 C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). International Labour Organisation. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182
- 2 McKnight, RH, and Spiller, HA. Green tobacco sickness in children and adolescents. *Public Health Rep* 2005;120(6):602-605. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1497768/>
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Cited in: Tobacco Industry Act (Act 10 of 2019). Malawi Laws (2019). Available at: <https://malawilaws.com/malawi-bulletin-2019-acts>
See also: Duncan Mlanjira. Malawi: Norway Partners ILO to Improve Working Conditions in Malawi's Tobacco Industry. *Nyasa Times* (11 December 2020). Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202012140122.html>
- 4 Line Eldring, Sabata Nakanyane and Malehoko Tshoedi. Child Labour in the Tobacco Growing Sector in Africa- Report prepared for the IUF/ITGA/BAT Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, Nairobi 8-9th October 2000. Fafo-paper 2000:21 (November 2000). Available at: <https://fafo.no/images/pub/2000/654.pdf>
- 5 It is up to governments to make this classification of hazardous work. ILO has a compendium of several (not all) countries and what they classify as hazardous work. Parties to C-182 are required to design and implement a national action plan on the elimination of child labour and to set up a mechanism to oversee, monitor, and report on its implementation.
- 6 Not all forms of working by children are illegal. Child labour is a subset of working children because child labour excludes children who work only a few hours a week in permitted light work and those who are above the minimum age who engage in work not classified as a worst form of child labour.
- 7 Described and as understood in ILO C. 182.
See: C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). International Labour Organisation. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182
- 8 ILO C. 182, Article 3(d). See: C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). International Labour Organisation. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182#:~:text=\(d\)%20work%20which%2C%20by%20its%20nature%20or%20the%20circumstances%20in%20which%20it%20is%20carried%20out%2C%20is%20likely%20to%20harm%20the%20health%2C%20safety%20or%20morals%20of%20children.](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182#:~:text=(d)%20work%20which%2C%20by%20its%20nature%20or%20the%20circumstances%20in%20which%20it%20is%20carried%20out%2C%20is%20likely%20to%20harm%20the%20health%2C%20safety%20or%20morals%20of%20children.)
See also: R190 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation, 1999 (No. 190). International Labour Organisation. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R190
ILO Recommendation No. 190 are: Any work that exposes children to sexual abuse (physically or psychologically), any work that is done underground, under water, at dangerous heights or in confined spaces, any work that is done with dangerous machinery, equipment and tools, any work that involves the manual handling or transport of heavy loads, any work that is done in an unhealthy environment which may, for example, expose children to hazardous substances, agents or processes, or to temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations damaging to their health, any work that is done under particularly difficult conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work where the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the employer."
- 9 ILO C. 182, Article 4. See: C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). International Labour Organisation. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182
- 10 See: Child Labour- Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward. International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, New York (2021). License: CC BY 4.0. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_797515.pdf
- 11 "Seventy-nine million children – nearly half of all those in child labour – were in hazardous work directly endangering their health, safety and moral development."
See: Child Labour- Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward. International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, New York (2021). License: CC BY 4.0. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_797515.pdf
- 12 See: Child Labour- Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward. International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, New York (2021). License: CC BY 4.0. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_797515.pdf
- 13 "Vera Da Costa eSilva said about 1.3 million children a year were working in tobacco fields in 2011 and, according to the UN's International Labour Organization (ILO)."
See: Child labour rampant in tobacco industry. Sarah Boseley. *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/revealed-child-labour-rampant-in-tobacco-industry>
See also: Global Estimates of Child Labour: Results and trends, 2012-2016. International Labour Organisation (19 September 2017). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_575499/lang--en/index.htm
- 14 The study conducted by the ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), says child labour - which involves one in every six children in the world - can be eliminated and replaced by universal education by the year 2020 at an estimated total cost of US\$ 760 billion.... The study argues that the costs are a "wise investment" ..yielding global benefits of just over US\$ 5 trillion. Yet even if the effect of education on future earnings was halved to 5 per cent, the study estimates that global benefits would still exceed US\$ 2 trillion.
See: New ILO study says economic benefits of eliminating child labour will vastly outweigh costs. International Labour Organisation (3 February 2004). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_005220/lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=What%20is%20more%2C%20the%20study,cost%20of%20US%24%20760%20billion.
- 15 Even the tobacco industry's own report, prepared by prepared for the IUF/ITGA/BAT Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, Nairobi 8-9th October 2000 showed that key drivers of child labour are cheap labour and poverty.
See: Line Eldring, Sabata Nakanyane and Malehoko Tshoedi. Child Labour in the Tobacco Growing Sector in Africa- Report prepared for the IUF/ITGA/BAT Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, Nairobi 8-9th October 2000. Fafo-paper 2000:21 (November 2000). Available at: <https://fafo.no/images/pub/2000/654.pdf>
- 16 Lack of appropriate legal framework and government policies are emphasised as important areas for improvement. Although it is recognized that laws and statutes are not very useful unless they are followed up by efficient implementation processes. Other causes listed, e.g. in Ghana: low family incomes, large family sizes, lack of resources to develop land, discriminatory and tenure system/pressures on land, piece-rate system of work, low wages of formal sector employees, tribal ethnic conflicts, underemployment, certain traditional/cultural beliefs and practices, irresponsible parentage, lack of proper legislation, large informal sector, debt bondage, single parenthood, societal acceptance of child labour as part of child upbringing, collapse of extended family systems, preference of boy education to girl education, lack of social protection for orphans.
See: Line Eldring, Sabata Nakanyane and Malehoko Tshoedi. Child Labour in the Tobacco Growing Sector in Africa- Report prepared for the IUF/ITGA/BAT Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, Nairobi 8-9th October 2000. Fafo-paper 2000:21 (November 2000). Available at: <https://fafo.no/images/pub/2000/654.pdf>
- 17 McKnight, RH, and Spiller, HA. Green tobacco sickness in children and adolescents. *Public Health Rep* 2005;120(6):602-605. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1497768/>
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See also: Based on a profile of farmers in Brazil: "When assessing the health risks and the conditions affecting tobacco growers, the top three symptoms reported were: back pain (by 68%), post-harvesting sickness (53%) and depression (42%)."
See: Lee, T. Country practices in the implementation of Article 17 (Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. WHO FCTC (December 2019). Available at: <https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/country-practices-implementation-article-17-WHO-FCTC.PDF>
- 18 Child Labour- Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward. International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, New York (2021). License: CC BY 4.0. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_797515.pdf
See also: A Bitter Harvest: Child Labour and Human Rights Abuses on Tobacco Farms in Zimbabwe. Human Rights Watch (April 2018); ISBN: 978-1-6231-35874. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/zimbabwe0418_web_2.pdf
See also: J. L. Reyes and M.A. Kolandai. Child Labour in Tobacco Cultivation in the ASEAN Region. Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA) (September 2018). Available at: <https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/Child%20Labour%20Sept%202018.pdf>

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19 Pesticides On Tobacco- Federal Activities to Assess Risks and Monitor Residues. United States General Accounting Office; GAO-03-485 (March 2003). Available at: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-485.pdf> [accessed 7 June 2021]

Cited in: Tobacco's Hidden Children- Hazardous Child Labour in United States Tobacco Farming. Human Rights Watch (13 May 2014). Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/05/13/tobaccos-hidden-children/hazardous-child-labour-united-states-tobacco-farming>

See also: Riquinho DL, Hennington EA. Health, environment and working conditions in tobacco cultivation: a review of the literature. *Cien Saude Colet*. 2012 Jun;17(6):1587-600. PMID: 22699649. Available at: <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22699649/>. Cited in: Discussion Paper: The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An Accelerator for Sustainable Development. United Nations Development Programme, May 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/who-fctc-undp-wntd-2017.pdf?ua=1> (accessed on 31 May 2021).

20 Due to heavy lifting, climbing and strenuous manual labour for long hours in insect-laden dirty fields, including in extreme weather conditions, the child suffers from diseases, infections, fatigue, malnutrition as well as open wounds, lacerations and bruises caused by sharp equipment and lack of personal protective equipment.

See: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production. A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. *Health and Human Rights* 20(2):235-248 (December 2018). Available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6293346/ (accessed on 21 May 2021)

See also: Hazardous child labour in agriculture, tobacco sector (Safety and health). ILO (1 April 2004). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_5715/lang--en/index.htm

See also: CRC provisions affected by child labour includes, among others, the right to be protected from injury or exploitation (Article 19), right to highest attainable standard of health (Article 24), right to education (Article 28), right to leisure (Article 31) and the right to be protected from commercial exploitation (Article 32).

See: Convention on the Rights of the Child. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (November 1989). Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/crc.pdf>

21 Pesticides On Tobacco- Federal Activities to Assess Risks and Monitor Residues. United States General Accounting Office; GAO-03-485 (March 2003). Available at: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-485.pdf> [accessed 7 June 2021]

Cited in: Tobacco's Hidden Children- Hazardous Child Labour in United States Tobacco Farming. Human Rights Watch (13 May 2014). Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/05/13/tobaccos-hidden-children/hazardous-child-labour-united-states-tobacco-farming>

See also: Based on a profile of farmers in Brazil: "When assessing the health risks and the conditions affecting tobacco growers, the top three symptoms reported were: back pain (by 68%), post-harvesting sickness (53%) and depression (42%)."

See: Lee, T. Country practices in the implementation of Article 17 (Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. WHO FCTC (December 2019). Available at: <https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/country-practices-implementation-article-17-WHO-FCTC.PDF>

22 "The tobacco industry should stop all political lobbying activities and avoid cloudy scientific statements. They could even completely withdraw from issuing scientific statements at all and rather publish those of the WHO or other reliable sources on their websites and in their CSR reports. Tobacco companies should stop using philanthropic engagement for building reputation. Philip Morris may for instance continue the engagement against domestic violence, they may even continue to use this engagement for internal motivation and identification, but they should not publicly talk about it."

See: Palazzo, G., & Richter, U. CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 61(4), 387-401 (November 2005). Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25123633?seq=1>

23 See: Palazzo, G., & Richter, U. CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 61(4), 387-401 (November 2005). Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25123633?seq=1>

24 "Moreover, Parties shall act to protect the implementation of Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC against the commercial and vested interests (interference) by the tobacco industry in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Convention and the guidelines for its implementation."

See: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control)- Report by the working group. Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; Sixth session. FCTC/COP/6/12 (18 July 2014). Available at: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_12-en.pdf

25 Sustainable supply chain management - Progress in 2019. Philip Morris International. Available at: <https://www.pmi.com/integrated-report-2019/operating-with-excellence/sustainable-supply-chain-management---progress-2019>

See also: Sustainable Tobacco Programme. British American Tobacco. Available at: https://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk_9d9kcy.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO9DEEBL

See also: Sustainability- Respecting Human Rights. Japan Tobacco. Available at: https://www.jt.com/sustainability/human_rights/index.html

26 For example:

"Protecting human rights is a clear priority for us and we are proud of what we have achieved so far. It is 20 years since we became founder members of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco (ECLT) Foundation. We have robust policies in place outlining our commitments to ensuring our operations are free from child labour and exploitation of labour, underpinned by comprehensive due diligence, monitoring and remediation programmes" - BAT Human Rights report, 2020

"...we will allocate our resources and efforts toward further implementing our Living Income program, which we consider a key enabler to address labour abuses and particularly child labour issues." - PMI Integrated report, 2020

"Through our flagship program ARISE - Achieving Reduction of Child Labour in Support of Education - we have been committed to tackling child labour in our tobacco growing communities since 2011." - JTI Integrated report, 2020

27 "We would like to thank the ECLT Foundation, their Board of Directors, as well as all ECLT Secretariat members for a tremendously successful and rewarding two-decade partnership. We expect and look forward to continuing to support the Foundation's mission at the local level in its continued efforts to eliminate child labour from tobacco-growing supply chains." -Maurio Gonzalez, PMI Director, Sustainable Agriculture, PMI Integrated report, 2020

"Protecting human rights is a clear priority for us and we are proud of what we have achieved so far. It is 20 years since we became founder members of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco (ECLT) Foundation. We have robust policies in place outlining our commitments to ensuring our operations are free from child labour and exploitation of labour, underpinned by comprehensive due diligence, monitoring and remediation programmes" - BAT Human Rights report, 2020

28 "PMI... arguing that "[t]obacco growing and manufacturing take around one-third of the water required to make the same amount of tea or one-sixth that of coffee or chocolate (per weight of finished product)". PMI's comparison attempts to put tobacco on par with these other products, ignoring the differentiator that these other products do not kill one in two of their daily users, as tobacco does..."

See: Hendlin, Y.H., Bialous, S.A. The environmental externalities of tobacco manufacturing: A review of tobacco industry reporting. *Ambio* 49, 17-34 (2020). Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13280-019-01148-3>

29 WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2019. Geneva: World Health Organization (25 July 2019). Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Available at: <https://www.who.int/teams/health-promotion/tobacco-control/who-report-on-the-global-tobacco-epidemic-2019>

30 "The total economic cost of smoking (from health expenditures and productivity losses together) totalled PPP \$1852 billion (US\$1436 billion) in 2012, equivalent in magnitude to 1.8% of the world's annual gross domestic product (GDP). Almost 40% of this cost occurred in developing countries, highlighting the substantial burden these countries suffer."

See: Goodchild M, Nargis N, Tursan d'Espaignet E. Global economic cost of smoking-attributable diseases. *Tobacco Control* (2018);27:58-64. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/27/1/58>

31 "Tobacco industry's efforts to reduce their environmental harms amount to CSR initiatives displaying a lack of transparency and independent verification, that limit objective assessment of the environmental impact of tobacco manufacturing."

See: Hendlin, Y.H., Bialous, S.A. The environmental externalities of tobacco manufacturing: A review of tobacco industry reporting. *Ambio* 49, 17-34 (2020). Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13280-019-01148-3>

32 "Parties should, using appropriate instruments, create or improve regulatory mechanisms for the control and inspection of industry activities concerning labour relations and workers' health."

"Tackling child labour and promoting decent work in tobacco-growing regions."

See: Policy Options and Recommendations on Economically Sustainable Alternatives to Tobacco Growing (in Relation to Articles 17 And 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties; sixth session (decision FCTC/COP6(11)) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22

33 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22

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34 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) refuse to speak to tobacco industry.

See: Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on the protection of public health policies with respect to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry. WHO FCTC. Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf

See also: Palazzo, G., & Richter, U. CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 61(4), 387-401 (November 2005). Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25123633?seq=1>

35 Private sector initiatives such as the Cocoa Initiative a voluntary agreement among industry actors to set up a foundation to address farming concerns alongside governments, and is currently recognized for good practices, is not congruous for the tobacco sector. (Cocoa Initiative: In 2001, a voluntary agreement called the Harkin-Engel Protocol, was accepted by the international cocoa and chocolate industry to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, as defined by ILO's Convention 182, in West Africa.

See: The Harkin-Engel Protocol. *Slave Free Chocolate* (2011) [website]. Available at: <https://www.slavefreechocolate.org/harkin-engel-protocol>

36 "Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents.

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

37 ". Brazil, ... farmworker advocates ... see as unfair practices by large tobacco companies. Farm families are not guaranteed minimum earnings. The companies determine both the price of the agricultural inputs—seeds, pesticides, and other supplies, which farmers are required to buy from the companies—as well as the price and classification of the tobacco leaf once it's harvested. Small farmers have little control or room to negotiate."

See: Margaret Wurth. *Tobacco's Children. Brazil Sets an Example for the U.S.* *The Progressive* (3 November 2015). Available at: <https://progressive.org/magazine/tobacco-s-children.-brazil-sets-example-u.s./>

38 "Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents. Living and working conditions are poor, perpetuating extreme forms of child labour and a growing problem of human trafficking. Conditions of work include low wages and salaries, low tobacco prices, the lack of written contracts, lack of collective bargaining agreements, lack of freedom of association, poor housing, poor drinking water, polluted soils, reduced protections of occupational health and safety, and lack of capital."

"As for smallholder farmers, they lack arable land for farming, and experience shortages of capital, high input rates, and high loan interest rates for inputs and they lack access to markets for their products."

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

39 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

See also: "As for smallholder farmers, they lack arable land for farming, and experience shortages of capital, high input rates, and high loan interest rates for inputs and they lack access to markets for their products."

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

40 Tobacco and Allied Farmers Workers' Union Malawi, Tobacco workers to ILO: Quit Tobacco Industry. Unfair Tobacco (29 September 2017). Available at: <https://www.unfairtobacco.org/en/tobacco-workers-to-ilo-quit-tobacco-industry/#/>

41 In Brazil, Tobacco Workers Union (Sintrafumo), which tried to unify factory workers and producers. In 1989, a joint strike was held for the first time, with roadblocks and factory gate picket lines. Immediately after that the organization started to come under legal challenges and subject to fines by local public authorities. The companies never accepted the union as part of negotiations, and it ceased to exist. As time went by, class associations were called to take part in negotiations and reduced their resistance. These days, there are no unions or associations in the producing regions willing to put pressure on corporations for them to improve the producers' situation.

See: Peres, J. and Neto, M. Roucos E Sufocados- Tobacco Industry Lives and Kills. Available at: https://actbr.org.br/uploads/arquivos/Suma%CC%81rio_Roucos_Ingles.pdf

42 Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

"The Union has been denied our full rights to freedom of association, in particular the right to organise and collective bargaining even though Malawi is a signatory to eight fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO),... "

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

See also: Tobacco companies, by virtue of denying TOAWUM rights to organise and enter into collective bargaining agreements, exacerbate the injustices that exist in the tobacco value chain. ECLT does not take an empowering, rights-based approach that would help communities demand a more just share of the value chain for their labour, and thus ease the poverty that drives child labour. It is a charity program focusing on the issues the industry has on its agenda, rather than local farmers.

See: Tobacco and Allied Farmers Workers' Union Malawi, Tobacco workers to ILO: Quit Tobacco Industry. Unfair Tobacco (29 September 2017). Available at: <https://www.unfairtobacco.org/en/tobacco-workers-to-ilo-quit-tobacco-industry/#/>

43 Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

44 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

45 The tobacco companies also encouraged excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals as well as shifting cultivation to virgin fertile lands. Their deceptive CSR programs shift attention away from real issues, such as keeping tobacco prices very low, socio-economic inequalities, child labour, health hazards, undermining the voices of farmers, instead of addressing them.

See: Lecours N, Almeida GEG, Abdallah JM, et al. Environmental health impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. *Tobacco Control* (February 2012);21:191-196. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191>

See also: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

46 "Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents.. As for smallholder farmers, they lack arable land for farming, and experience shortages of capital, high input rates, and high loan interest rates for inputs and they lack access to markets for their products."

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

See also: Letter to the United Nations Global Compact: Remove ECLT as a Participant. STOP (30 April 2021). Available at: <https://exposetobacco.org/news/ungc-ect/>

See also: "For example, in 2014, Phillip Morris International noted that it would buy tobacco only from third-party leaf companies rather than from direct contracts with growers, which was promoted as way to increase accountability, oversight, and implementation of strict standards regarding child labour."

"However, this transferred responsibility for monitoring child labour from the tobacco companies to the leaf companies, while allowing the tobacco companies to reap the benefit of cheap leaf products and continue to escape culpability for the problem. By promoting these types of initiatives, tobacco companies stand to gain political support and weaken opposition, especially in low-income and middle-income countries, where there may be less external monitoring by civil society and where financial contributions from these companies may have a greater impact."

See also: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. *Health and Human Rights Journal* (7 August 2018). Available at: <https://www.hhrjournal.org/2018/08/child-labour-in-global-tobacco-production-a-human-rights-approach-to-an-enduring-dilemma/>

47 ILO, "Decision 709, Minutes of the 337th Session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office Governing Body 337th Session, Geneva, 24 October–7 November 2019," November 11, 2020. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---reconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_760869.pdf

48 Article 17 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) states that Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent international and regional intergovernmental organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as the case may be, individual sellers.

See: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

49 DECISION: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; seventh session; FCTC/COP7(10) (12 November 2016). Available at: [https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7\(10\)_EN.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7(10)_EN.pdf?ua=1)

50 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

51 Warner, Kenneth. (2000). *The Economics of Tobacco: Myths and Realities*. Tobacco control. 9. 78-89. 10.1136/tc.9.1.78. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/1/78.full.pdf>

52 ibid

53 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

See also: In a press release on tobacco leaf purchases, the tobacco companies proudly announces how it contributes to tobacco agriculture and in the same PR made a pitch to have regulation in favor of novel products and complain about tax increases.

"Mr. Gorkun said PMFTC, the Philippine affiliate of Philip Morris International, sourced 43% of its leaf purchases from local farmers last year, both directly and through suppliers. The volume supplied a portion of the firm's production in the Philippines and in 15 other countries."

See: PMFTC to buy \$130-M tobacco leaves locally. Business World (21 October 2020). Available at: <https://www.bworldonline.com/pmftc-to-buy-130-m-tobacco-leaves-locally/>

54 Otañez, M G et al. "Eliminating child labour in Malawi: a British American Tobacco corporate responsibility project to sidestep tobacco labour exploitation." Tobacco control vol. 15,3 (2006): 224-30. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2564665/>

See also: Assunta M. Tobacco industry's ITGA fights FCTC implementation in the Uruguay negotiations. Tobacco Control (May 2012);21:563-568. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/6/563.long>

See also: ITGA claims "The aim of the association is to share non-competitive information and monitor market conditions, build mutual understanding and protect members and their dependents. Its policies and activities are developed by the growers to further their own interests."

However, tobacco industry documents reveal that the true intention behind ITGA is to advance tobacco industry lobbying, especially in developing countries. In the early nineties, one of ITGA's specific aim was to dilute WHO's tobacco control efforts. They expanded UN's work on tobacco beyond the WHO. They stressed that a successful 'Tobacco and Health Program' will cause a negative socio-economic impact on countries that produce tobacco.

See: Emma Must. ITGA uncovered: Unravelling the spin – the truth behind the claims. PATH Canada Guide (June 2001). Available at: <https://healthbridge.ca/images/uploads/library/itgabr.pdf>

55 See: DECISION: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; seventh session; FCTC/COP7(10) (12 November 2016). Available at: [https://www.who.int/fctc/cop7/FCTC_COP7\(10\)_EN.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/fctc/cop7/FCTC_COP7(10)_EN.pdf?ua=1) (accessed 5 June 2021).

See also: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control)- Report by the working group. Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; Sixth session. FCTC/COP/6/12 (18 July 2014). Available at: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_12-en.pdf

See also: Policy Options : Public financing and incentives directly linked to tobacco growing should be discontinued, in accordance with national law and policies, taking into account possible adverse impact on tobacco growers.

"Proposed actions- 1. Tobacco-growing countries should not encourage and not provide any incentives to increase the acreage of land used for cultivating tobacco. 2. Tobacco-growing countries should consider reallocating public funds/subsidies used for tobacco production to alternative livelihoods activities."

See: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

56 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

57 "Many farmers—including many with contracts with oligopolistic leaf-buying companies—pay too much for inputs (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides, etc.), receive very low prices for their leaf, and dedicate hundreds of hours to a mostly unprofitable economic pursuit. The opportunity costs of farming tobacco are high, with farmers missing out on human capital development and more lucrative economic opportunities."

See: Issue: Growing. The Tobacco Atlas [website]. Available at: <https://tobaccoatlas.org/topic/growing/> [accessed 8 June 2021].

See also: Jones, A., Austin, W., Beach, R., & Altman, D. Tobacco Farmers and Tobacco Manufacturers: Implications for Tobacco Control in Tobacco-Growing Developing Countries. Journal of Public Health Policy, 29(4), 406-423; (2008). Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40207207>

See also: "Tobacco companies exploit through contract arrangement and leaf buying practices the smallholder and tenant farmers that TOAWUM represents... As for smallholder farmers, they lack arable land for farming, and experience shortages of capital, high input rates, and high loan interest rates for inputs and they lack access to markets for their products."

See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).

58 Sy, D. Tobacco Industry Interference and Tobacco Taxation. B2B#12. July 2020, University of Cape Town. REEP Back to Basics Policy Brief (July 2020). Available at: https://untobacco-control.org/kh/taxation/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/09/KH_1pager-12_Tobacco-Industry-Interference-Taxation.pdf

59 See: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control)- Report by the working group. Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; Sixth session. FCTC/COP/6/12 (18 July 2014). Available at: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_12-en.pdf

60 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

See also: Warner, Kenneth. (2000). The Economics of Tobacco: Myths and Realities. Tobacco control. 9. 78-89. 10.1136/tc.9.1.78. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/1/78.full.pdf>

61 "In Thailand, Philip Morris International funds environmental projects to achieve their own ends by supporting villagers in tobacco growing regions. For example, funding the Phrae Provincial Administrative Organization (PPAO) to create dams in their region to provide water for agricultural production and fire prevention."

See: The Tobacco Industry and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): An Overview From South East Asia. South East Asia Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SIS), SEATCA (June 2011). Available at: <https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/CSR%20fact%20sheet.pdf>

62 Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

63 "Where appropriate, parties should also consider to create incentives for promoting, supporting or shifting to alternate livelihoods and to avoid incentives for tobacco growing."

See: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18). Conference of the Parties, sixth session and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control decision; FCTC/COP6(11) (2014). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Recommendations_Articles_17_18_English.pdf?ua=1%22 [accessed 5 June 2021].

64 Raw M, Regan S, Rigotti NA, McNeill A. A survey of tobacco dependence treatment guidelines in 31 countries. Addiction. 2009;104(7):1243-1250. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2736395/>

65 Raw M, Regan S, Rigotti NA, McNeill A. A survey of tobacco dependence treatment guidelines in 31 countries. Addiction. 2009;104(7):1243-1250. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2736395/>

66 T. Lee. Country practices in the implementation of Article 17 (Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. WHO FCTC (December 2019). Available at: <https://www.who.int/fctc/implementation/publications/country-practices-implementation-article-17-WHO-FCTC.PDF>

See also: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). In: WHO FCTC COP6. 18 October 2014. Decision FCTC/COP6(11). Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). WHO FCTC COP, Sixth session, Moscow, Russian Federation, 13-18 October 2014. Available from: [https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6\(11\)-en.pdf](https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6(11)-en.pdf) (accessed 5 June 2021).

67 "Through private voluntary initiatives like social auditing, ethical certification and supplier codes of conduct, big multi-national corporations (MNCs)... One of the most urgent and problematic failures of top-down CSR relates to its limited effectiveness in addressing forced labour, which tends to occur in outsourced, informal portions of labour and product supply chains." See: Bartley, Tim. (2018). Rules without Rights: Land, Labour, and Private Authority in the Global Economy. 10.1093/os0/9780198794332.001.0001. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319547514_Rules_without_Rights_Land_Labour_and_Private_Authority_in_the_Global_Economy

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68 Sustainable supply chain management - Progress in 2019. Philip Morris International. Available at: <https://www.pmi.com/integrated-report-2019/operating-with-excellence/sustainable-supply-chain-management---progress-2019>

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See: Lecours N, Almeida GEG, Abdallah JM, et al. Environmental health impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. *Tobacco Control* (February 2012);21:191-196. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191>

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"Brand image is also crucial to a CSR calculus. Some companies have been shown to spend more money on advertising their CSR than they actually spent on sustainability or social responsibility projects."

See: Hendlin, Y.H., Bialous, S.A. The environmental externalities of tobacco manufacturing: A review of tobacco industry reporting. *Ambio* 49, 17-34 (January 2020). Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13280-019-01148-3>

See also: Patricia A. McDaniel and Ruth E. Malone, 2012: "The Big WHY": Philip Morris's Failed Search for Corporate Social Value. *American Journal of Public Health* 102, 1942-1950. Available at: <https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300619>

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73 Hendlin, Y.H., Bialous, S.A. The environmental externalities of tobacco manufacturing: A review of tobacco industry reporting. *Ambio* 49, 17-34 (January 2020). Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13280-019-01148-3>

74 BAT, Imperial Brands, PMI and JTI are actively using Twitter as a new communication platform to oppose tobacco control policy and shape their public identity. For the FCTC to be effective in curbing the influence of the tobacco industry, cross-border advertising guidelines need to be detailed and CSR activities should be more widely legislated against by parties to the convention. This is critical to ensure the FCTC's application and enforcement is relevant, comprehensive and free of loopholes that the industry can exploit.

See: Watts C, Hefler M, Freeman B. 'We have a rich heritage and, we believe, a bright future': how transnational tobacco companies are using Twitter to oppose policy and shape their public identity. *Tobacco Control* Published Online First: 17 April 2018. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/28/2/227>

75 Across the four Twitter accounts analysed in the current study, a relatively large proportion of tweets highlighted environmentally sustainable business practices and efforts to have a positive social impact. However, without knowing that tobacco growing and manufacturing causes significant damage to land and agriculture, contributes to poverty and food insecurity, utilises children for labour, consumes comparatively large amounts of energy and water, pollutes the air and generates colossal amounts of waste, tweets of this nature have the potential to mislead readers that TTC's are making a positive impact on these issues, rather than significantly causing or contributing to them. For example, tweets such as "140 million trees planted between 2007 and 2012 through our afforestation programmes #trees #afforestation, published by BAT, are misleading as tobacco growing and curing is a major cause of deforestation and is responsible for the loss of an estimated 1.5 billion hectares of forest since the 1970s.

See: Christina Watts. Tobacco industry interference in supply-side policies in Australia. Sydney School of Public Health, Faculty of Medicine and Health, University of Sydney (2021). Available at: https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/24682/Christina_Watts_Thesis_18%20March%202021.pdf?sequence=2

76 Tweets that focus on reducing child labour and promoting human rights generally and/or the work the company is doing to prevent or stop child labour or human rights abuses in their tobacco farming communities. For example: What are the challenges of tackling child labour in tobacco growing communities? #nochildlabour JTI's tweets were about issues of child labour and human rights, many of which referenced the 'ARISE Program', which is a joint venture of JTI, Winrock International and the International Labour Organisation to reduce child labour in the countries where JTI operates.

See: Watts C, Hefler M, Freeman B. 'We have a rich heritage and, we believe, a bright future': how transnational tobacco companies are using Twitter to oppose policy and shape their public identity. *Tobacco Control* Published Online First: 17 April 2018. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/28/2/227>

77 As highlighted in the report by Genevieve et al., auditing as a mechanism of transnational governance is exclusionary and failing. While the pressure for an accountable and transparent approach to corporate functioning has been increasing, these audit regimes are being used to preserve the retail business models which focus on cheap labour, cheap goods, low prices and short-term purchase contracts.

See: Genevieve LeBaron, Jane Lister & Peter Dauvergne (2017) Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability through the Ethical Audit Regime, *Globalizations*, 14:6, 958-975. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2017.1304008>

78 The tobacco industry's response to such environmental harms was to work with agricultural front groups and partnering with renowned organisations in order to lobby against tobacco control measures. Through these front groups such as ITGA, tobacco companies worked with sympathetic businessmen and politicians. The tobacco companies also encouraged excessive use of hazardous agrochemicals as well as shifting cultivation to virgin fertile lands. Their deceptive CSR programs shift attention away from real issues, such as keeping tobacco prices very low, socio-economic inequalities, child labour, health hazards, undermining the voices of farmers, instead of addressing them.

See: Lecours N, Almeida GEG, Abdallah JM, et al. Environmental health impacts of tobacco farming: a review of the literature. *Tobacco Control* (February 2012);21:191-196. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/191>

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- 79 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. World Health Organization (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/
See also: Policy options and recommendations on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). In: WHO FCTC COP6. 18 October 2014. Decision FCTC/COP6(11). Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). WHO FCTC COP, Sixth session, Moscow, Russian Federation, 13-18 October 2014. Available from: [https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6\(11\)-en.pdf](https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6(11)-en.pdf) (accessed 5 June 2021).
See also: WHO Statement on Philip Morris funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free World. WHO (28 September 2017). Available at: <https://www.who.int/news/item/28-09-2017-who-statement-on-philip-morris-funded-foundation-for-a-smoke-free-world>
- 80 "(b) to urge Parties, when implementing Articles 17 and 18, to adopt a whole-of-government and stakeholder participatory approaches keeping in mind Article 5.3 in promoting alternatives to tobacco growing, and avoid tobacco industry obstruction in programmes meant for the welfare and diversification of tobacco growers and workers and the protection of the environment, as appropriate in the national context."
See: DECISION: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC). Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; seventh session; FCTC/COP7(10) (12 November 2016). Available at: [https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7\(10\)_EN.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP7(10)_EN.pdf?ua=1) (accessed 5 June 2021).
- 81 Tobacco Industry Front Groups and Activities. South East Asia Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SIS), SEATCA (October 2010). Available at: <https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/TI%20front%20groups%20fact%20sheet.pdf>
See also: Tobacco Industry Front Group: The International Tobacco Growers' Association. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (November 2011). Available at: https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/en/IW_interference_ITGA_fact_sheet.pdf
See also: ITGA claims "The aim of the association is to share non-competitive information and monitor market conditions, build mutual understanding and protect members and their dependents. Its policies and activities are developed by the growers to further their own interests."
However, tobacco industry documents reveal that the true intention behind ITGA is to advance tobacco industry lobbying, especially in developing countries. In the early nineties, one of ITGA's specific aim was to dilute WHO's tobacco control efforts. They expanded UN's work on tobacco beyond the WHO. They stressed that a successful 'Tobacco and Health Program' will cause a negative socio-economic impact on countries that produce tobacco.
See: Emma Must. ITGA uncovered: Unravelling the spin – the truth behind the claims. PATH Canada Guide (June 2001). Available at: <https://healthbridge.ca/images/uploads/library/itgabr.pdf>
- 82 Tobacco Institute of India v. Union of India. Tobacco Control Laws. Available at: <https://www.tobaccocontrolaws.org/litigation/decisions/in-20160114-tobacco-institute-of-india-v.-judicial-review-of-law-no.-36-of-2009-ruling-in-case-no.-24-tobacco-control-laws>. Available at: <https://www.tobaccocontrolaws.org/litigation/decisions/id-00000000-judicial-review-of-law-no.-36->
Judicial Review of Law No. 36 of 2009, Ruling in Case No. 66. Tobacco Control Laws. Available at: <https://www.tobaccocontrolaws.org/litigation/decisions/id-00000000-judicial-review-of-law-no.-36--1-2>
Judicial Review of Article 113 of Law No. 36 of 2009, Ruling in Case No. 19. Tobacco Control Laws. Available at: <https://www.tobaccocontrolaws.org/litigation/decisions/id-20111101-judicial-review-of-article-114>
- 83 Warner, Kenneth. (2000). The Economics of Tobacco: Myths and Realities. Tobacco control. 9. 78-89. 10.1136/tc.9.1.78. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/1/78.full.pdf>
See also: Sy, D. Tobacco Industry Interference and Tobacco Taxation. B2B#12. July 2020, University of Cape Town. REEP Back to Basics Policy Brief (July 2020). Available at: https://untobaccocontrol.org/kh/taxation/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/09/KH_1pager-12_Tobacco-Industry-Interference-Taxation.pdf
See also: Tobacco industry tactics: tax policies. World Health Organisation WHO-EM/TFI/200/E (2019). Available at: <https://applications.emro.who.int/docs/FS-TFI-200-2019-EN.pdf?ua=1>
See also: Assunta M. Tobacco industry's ITGA fights FCTC implementation in the Uruguay negotiations. Tobacco Control (May 2012);21:563-568. Available at: <https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/6/563.long>
- 84 See: Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union Of Malawi (TOAWUM)'s letter to the President of the Republic of Malawi (10 October 2014).
Tobacco companies, by virtue of denying TOAWUM rights to organise and enter into collective bargaining agreements, exacerbate the injustices that exist in the tobacco value chain. ECLT does not take an empowering, rights-based approach that would help communities demand a more just share of the value chain for their labour, and thus ease the poverty that drives child labour. It is a charity program focusing on the issues the industry has on its agenda, rather than local farmers.
See: Tobacco and Allied Farmers Workers' Union Malawi, Tobacco workers to ILO: Quit Tobacco Industry. Unfair Tobacco (29 September 2017). Available at: <https://www.unfairtobacco.org/en/tobacco-workers-to-ilo-quit-tobacco-industry/#/>
- 85 Agricultural Transformation Initiative (ATI), Foundation for a Smoke-Free World [website]. Available at: <https://www.smokefreeworld.org/agriculture-livelihoods/agricultural-transformation-initiative/>
- 86 "Therefore, one of the key ambitions of the tobacco industry is to distance itself from its own former behavior demanding that the public should judge it by its current actions and not by its past activities. They portray themselves as a reformed industry and CSR engagement as well as CSR rhetoric are key elements of this strategy. However, a lot of relevant audiences still do not trust tobacco corporations because they do not believe in a genuine rupture with the past. The discovery of CSR in the tobacco industry is suspected to blur the "real" intentions of the corporations, their hidden agenda of business as usual. And indeed, some patterns of behavior of tobacco companies give reason to distrust the authenticity of their CSR engagement."
See: awang olong, Kingsly. Contentious Corporate Social Responsibility Practices by British American Tobacco in Cameroon. (January 2016). SSRN Electronic Journal. 8. 10.2139/ssrn.2726876. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314695279_Contentious_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_Practices_by_British_American_Tobacco_in_Cameroon
- 87 "The first CSR report in the tobacco industry was published by BAT. It has been criticized for concealing the central aspect of its business, the annual death of millions of people."
See: Palazzo, G., & Richter, U. CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 61(4), 387-401 (November 2005). Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25123633?seq=1>
- 88 "US tobacco farms will now need to meet higher child labour standards that should protect children from the most dangerous work in tobacco farming," said Margaret Wurth, children's rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. "Philip Morris International should carefully monitor suppliers to ensure they know the rules and follow them."
- 89 Human Rights Watch in a May 14 report found that children working on tobacco farms in the United States are exposed to nicotine, toxic pesticides, extreme heat, and other dangers. Most of the children interviewed reported experiencing nausea, vomiting, headaches, or dizziness while working – symptoms consistent with acute nicotine poisoning."
See: US: Tobacco Giant's Move Could Reduce Child Labour. Human Rights Watch (5 November 2014). Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/05/us-tobacco-giants-move-could-reduce-child-labour>
"E.g. An affiliate of Philip Morris International had previously bought tobacco leaf produced by the company's own contracted growers and processed that tobacco in its own facility. Philip Morris International will buy processed grades of tobacco from the Universal subsidiary starting with the 2019 crop. Universal said the supply agreement "is expected to provide important supply chain efficiencies" and indicates both companies' commitment to buy Philippine-grown leaf tobacco."
See: John Reid Blackwell. Universal Corp. says it will supply tobacco from the Philippines to Philip Morris International. Richmond Times-Dispatch (6 February 2019). Available at: https://richmond.com/business/universal-corp-says-it-will-supply-tobacco-from-the-philippines-to-philip-morris-international/article_2516c313-43ac-54ca-aeaa-8f601ac79dd3.html
- 90 Claim against tobacco giants by poverty-stricken farmers in Malawi. Leigh Day (18 December 2020). Available at: <https://www.leighday.co.uk/latest-updates/news/2020-news/claim-against-tobacco-giants-by-poverty-stricken-farmers-in-malawi/>
See also: Malawi: Lawyers announce lawsuit demanding British American Tobacco compensate families working under poverty wages on tobacco fields; Company comments included. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (4 November 2019). Available at: <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/malawi-lawyers-announce-lawsuit-demanding-british-american-tobacco-compensate-families-working-under-poverty-wages-on-tobacco-fields-company-comments-included/>
See also: Malawi urged to turn over new leaf amid tobacco lawsuit. African Business (12 February 2020). Available at: <https://african.business/2020/02/economy/malawi-urged-to-turn-over-new-leaf-amid-tobacco-lawsuit/>
- 91 Geneva Sands. US suspends tobacco imports from Malawi over forced child labour allegations. CNN (1 November 2019). Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/01/politics/malawi-child-labour-allegations-tobacco/index.html>
- 92 Sarah Boseley. Tobacco firms in move to strike out Malawi exploitation case. The Guardian (19 May 2021). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/may/19/tobacco-firms-in-move-to-strike-out-malawi-exploitation-case?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

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- 93 Forthcoming publication "Towards health with justice 2" by World Health Organisation, Eastern Mediterranean Region.
See also: Letter to the United Nations Global Compact: Remove ECLT as a Participant. STOP (30 April 2021). Available at: <https://exposetobacco.org/news/ungc-ect/>
See also: Industry Brief: Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing (ECLT) Foundation. STOP (31 October 2019). Available at: http://exposetobacco.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/STOP_ECLT_brief.pdf
See also: "For example, in 2014, Phillip Morris International noted that it would buy tobacco only from third-party leaf companies rather than from direct contracts with growers, which was promoted as way to increase accountability, oversight, and implementation of strict standards regarding child labour."
"However, this transferred responsibility for monitoring child labour from the tobacco companies to the leaf companies, while allowing the tobacco companies to reap the benefit of cheap leaf products and continue to escape culpability for the problem. By promoting these types of initiatives, tobacco companies stand to gain political support and weaken opposition, especially in low-income and middle-income countries, where there may be less external monitoring by civil society and where financial contributions from these companies may have a greater impact."
See: Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Athena K. Ramos. Health and Human Rights Journal (7 August 2018). Available at: <https://www.hhrjournal.org/2018/08/child-labour-in-global-tobacco-production-a-human-rights-approach-to-an-enduring-dilemma/>
- 94 "In 2007, the Labour Court fled a series of lawsuits in order for the companies to acknowledge a relationship of employment with the producers. The private sector, however, alleges that there is just a service agreement contract held between the two parties. "Everything has a high impact. They talk about this contract of integration as if it were something very common, as if there was nothing illegal about it. It's very naturalized", says prosecutor Margaret Matos de Carvalho."
See: João Peres/Moriti Neto. Tobacco Industry Lives and Kills- Executive Summary. Roucos e Sofocados. Available at: https://actbr.org.br/uploads/arquivos/Suma%CC%81rio-Roucos_Ingles.pdf
- 95 Fabio Teixeira. Tobacco exporter faces slavery charges in landmark Brazil case. Thomson Reuters Foundation (2 March 2021). Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-slavery-tobacco-idUKL5N2KZ641>
- 96 Implementation of Article 19 of the WHO FCTC: "Liability". Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; Fifth session. FCTC/COP/5/11 (25 July 2012). Available at: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC_COP5_11-en.pdf
- 97 "The USDOL lists goods made with child labour or forced labour based on the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). Limitation of report: This report contains data from a total of 154 countries. Data from within the United States was not included. Also, for forced labour, the research covered workers of all ages and not children specifically."
See: 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. US Department of Labor (DOL). Available at: https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labour_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf (accessed 2 June 2021).
- 98 "In fact, tobacco is now produced in 125 countries, including Argentina, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Pakistan, Poland, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe."
See: Ramos AK. December 2018. Child Labour in Global Tobacco Production: A Human Rights Approach to an Enduring Dilemma. Health and Human Rights Journal. 2018;20(2):235-248. Available from: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6293346/> (accessed 1 June 2021).
See also: Drope J, Schluger N, Cahn Z, et al. 2018. The Tobacco Atlas. Atlanta: American Cancer Society and Vital Strategies. Available from: <https://tobaccoatlas.org/topic/growing/> (accessed 2 June 2021).
See also: "To check the area harvested, yield and/or production quantity of tobacco in various countries, filter results by selecting (a) "all countries" or any country/ies which you prefer; (b) "area harvested"; "yield" and/or "production quantity" under "elements"; (c) "tobacco, unmanufactured" under "items"; and (d) the year "2019" for the latest data available." See: UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAOSTAT, Crops. Available from: <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC> (accessed 2 June 2021)
See also: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control)- Report by the working group. Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; sixth session. FCTC/COP/6/12 (18 July 2014). Available at: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_12-en.pdf
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See also: Economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing (in relation to Articles 17 and 18 of the WHO FCTC): Report by the Convention Secretariat. WHO FCTC COP; seventh session, FCTC/COP/7/12 (14 July 2016). Available from: [https://fctc.who.int/who-fctc/governance/conference-of-the-parties/seventh-session-of-the-conference-of-the-parties/main-documents/fctc-cop-7-12-economically-sustainable-alternatives-to-tobacco-growing-\(in-relation-to-articles-17-and-18-of-the-who-fctc\)](https://fctc.who.int/who-fctc/governance/conference-of-the-parties/seventh-session-of-the-conference-of-the-parties/main-documents/fctc-cop-7-12-economically-sustainable-alternatives-to-tobacco-growing-(in-relation-to-articles-17-and-18-of-the-who-fctc)) (accessed 2 June 2021);
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- 100 "While most multinationals bar their suppliers from using children to perform the most dangerous tasks on tobacco farms, none of them ban youngsters from all work involving direct contact with tobacco – the only policy that we believe would properly protect children from nicotine exposure. Moreover, when multinationals buy their tobacco from traders on the open market in Indonesia, they do no due diligence to trace the leaf back to the farms where it was grown, so they have no way of knowing whether child labour was involved. This goes against the United Nation's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which state that companies should adopt effective measures to identify any abuses present in their supply chains and address them."
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See also: Among children engaged in other branches of economic activity, those engaged in designated hazardous occupations are identified. Designated hazardous occupations are those defined for the purpose of the ILO global estimates of child labour in ISCO-88 codes 313, 322-323, 516, 614-615, 711-713, 721-724, 731-732, 811-816, 821-823, 825-829, 832- 834, 911-912, 915-931, and 933.
See: International Standard Classification of Occupations- Structure, group definitions and correspondence tables. International Labour Office, ISCO-08, Volume1. Available at: <https://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/docs/publication08.pdf>
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- 103 Child Labour- Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward. International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, New York (2021). License: CC BY 4.0. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_797515.pdf

104 Consequences of tobacco production on the child:

“• Injuries from cutting tools ranging from minor cuts to severe wounds

- Injuries from contact with, or entanglement in, unguarded machinery or being hit by motorized vehicles
- Poisoning and long -term health problems from using or being exposed to pesticides
- Musculoskeletal injuries from repetitive and forceful movements, bending, and lifting and carrying heavy or awkward loads
- Heat exhaustion
- High levels of sun exposure which can result in skin cancer
- Snake and insect bites

• Green tobacco sickness can make workers nauseous. It is caused by nicotine and other substances being absorbed through the skin from contact with wet tobacco leaves.”

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About STOP (Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products)

STOP is a global tobacco industry watchdog whose mission is to expose the tobacco industry strategies and tactics that undermine public health. STOP is funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies and comprised of a partnership between the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) at the [University of Bath](#), [The Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control \(GGTC\)](#), the [International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease \(The Union\)](#) and [Vital Strategies](#). For more information, visit exposetobacco.org.





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